GETTEXT

Susceptible to environment variable driven buffer overflows

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Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

Mime-type: text/xml, size: 5438 bytes

Attack Category	Environment Manipulation		
Vulnerability Category	Buffer Overflow		
	• Unconditional		
Software Context	National Language Support		
	String Conversion MACROS		
Location	• libintl.h		
Description	The gettext function attempts to translate a text string into the user's native language by looking up the translation in a message catalog. The msgid argument identifies the message to be translated. By convention, it is the English version of the message, with non-ASCII characters replaced by ASCII approximations. This choice allows the translators to work with message catalogs, called PO files, that contain both the English and the translated versions of each message and can be installed using the msgfmt utility.		
	A message domain is a set of translatable msgid messages. Usually, every software package has it own message domain. The domain name is used to determine the message catalog where the translation is looked up; it must be a non-empty string. For the gettext function, it is specified through a preceding textdomain call.		
	gettext() accesses unvalidated information from the environment. Similar to getcat(), this function is used to look up messages in a message catalog, presumably for natural language translation. gettext() is susceptible to environment variable		
	driven buffer overflows.		
APIs	Function Name Comments		
	dcgettext		

^{1.} http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/about_us/authors/35-BSI.html (Barnum, Sean)

GETTEXT 1

	dengettext		arbitrary length	
	Jackson	string	string	
	dgettext			
	dngettext		returns arbitrary length string	
	gettext			
	ngettext	returns string	returns arbitrary length string	
Method of Attack	(LC_ALL or LC_variables) to prov	An attacker can manipulate the environment (LC_ALL or LC_MESSAGES environment variables) to provide a malicious set of messages that might overrun buffers. Static buffers need to be used with care.		
Exception Criteria				
Solutions	Solution Applicability	Solution Description	Solution Efficacy	
	Whenever using gettext()	All output from gettext() should be validated. If possible, validate LC_ALL and LC_MESSAGE prior to calling it. gettext() returns a const char* to the message; length should be checked before copying it to any buffer.		
Signature Details	char * gettext (con	char * gettext (const char * msgid);		
Examples of Incorrect Code	gettext("Ple	<pre>char * translation = gettext("Please try again"); char * error_msg [5]; strcpy(error_msg, translation);</pre>		
Examples of Corrected Code	char * trans gettext("Ple char * error	<pre>int buf_len = 10; char * translation = gettext("Please try again"); char * error_msg [buf_len]; strncpy(error_msg, translation, buf_len);</pre>		
Source References	• gettext() mar	 Rough Auditing Tool for Security (RATS)² gettext() man page GETTEXT ³(2001). 		

	-	• Arce, Ivan. FOLLOUP: UNIX locale vulnerability ⁴ (2000).		
Recommended Resource				
Discriminant Set	Operating System	• Windows		
	Languages	• C		
		• C++		

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GETTEXT 3

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